ABOUT US

The Centre for Competition Economics aims to enhance collaboration between academic and professional economists working in the area of competition policy. It serves as a platform for a reciprocal exchange of economic insights on critical issues in the field. Academic economists offer analysis grounded in recent research, while professional economists contribute perspectives based on practical market experience. This dialogue enriches policy discussions and supports informed decision-making in competition policy implementation.

To facilitate this exchange, the Centre hosts regular online seminars open to a broad audience. Each panel includes both academic and professional economists—such as those from consultancies or competition authorities—who share expertise on specific topics. The discussion focuses on extracting policy-relevant conclusions regarding the competitive impact of various business practices. These findings inform both academic work and policy analysis by clarifying the conditions under which certain practices may be considered pro- or anticompetitive.

Each year, the Centre also three awards for the best research paper in industrial organization written by young researchers. The selection emphasizes originality, methodological rigour, and relevance to competition policy. A one-day annual conference is organized around the three award winners who are invited to present their paper.

Although funded by RBB, the Centre operates with full independence. Its Board comprises seven members: Director Claire Chambolle, Fellows Germain Gaudin, Markus Reisinger and Otto Toivanen, and two RBB representatives—Benoît Durand, and Adrian Majumdar.

TOPICS

Mergers
Collusion
Vertical Restraints
Innovation
Industrial Policy
State Aid
PHD Award

Horizontal and vertical mergers are among the most heavily discussed topics in competition policy. There is a general presumption that horizontal mergers in the absence of marginal cost efficiencies lead to an increase in market power but that vertical mergers tend to be pro-competitive (e.g., via the elimination of double marginalization). These two presumptions are being challenged with many commentators currently arguing that merger policy, across the board, has been too lax in recent years. These raises important questions:

  • Has merger control been too permissive? If so, what are the policy implications? How robust is the evidence for supporting this position?
  • Is the consumer welfare standard usually employed antitrust laws useful or is it time for a change?
  • Do horizontal mergers always give rise to a price increase absent marginal cost efficiencies? Is this an empirical finding or an implication of economic modelling assumptions?
  • How useful are margins and diversion ratios for the assessment of horizontal mergers?
  • Are divestitures reasonable remedies? To which rival should a divested brand be sold?
  • Can acquisitions that are below the threshold of notification be anticompetitive?
  • Under which conditions do acquisitions of competitors lead to discontinuation of an innovation?
  • Are non-horizontal mergers in general pro-competitive or is the difference to horizontal mergers relatively small?