ABOUT US

The goal of the Centre for Competition Economics is to foster greater interaction between academic and professional economists active in the field of competition policy. The Centre will provide a forum that facilitates a two-way exchange of economics ideas on important topics in competition policy. Academic economists will provide insights from latest research while professional economists will provide insights from their deep analysis of the functioning of particular markets. Such an exchange of ideas will help provide insightful inputs into important policy decisions towards the implementation of competition policy.

To foster such two-way exchange, the Centre will have regular (online) seminars open to a wide audience. The panel will always include both academic and professional economists (e.g., from economic consultancies and/or competition authorities) who will contribute with their expertise on the particular topic of interest. The aim is to distil policy implications that provide insights on the competitive effects of different business practices. These insights can be used in academia and in policy work and help to obtain measurable results under which conditions a particular practice is pro- or anticompetitive.

In addition, each year, the Centre will award a prize of €10k for a very good research paper on competition economics from a Ph.D. student, where the focus will be on originality and rigour of research as well as the contribution to deepen our understanding on matters for competition policy.

The Centre is funded by RBB but is entirely independent. Its Board consists of 7 members, one Director (Markus Reisinger), 3 Fellows (Claire Chambolle, Diane Coyle, and Otto Toivanen), and 3 members from RBB (Simon Bishop, Benoît Durand, and Adrian Majumdar).

TOPICS

Mergers
Collusion
Vertical Restraints
Innovation
Industrial Policy
State Aid
PHD Award

Horizontal and vertical mergers are among the most heavily discussed topics in competition policy. There is a general presumption that horizontal mergers in the absence of marginal cost efficiencies lead to an increase in market power but that vertical mergers tend to be pro-competitive (e.g., via the elimination of double marginalization). These two presumptions are being challenged with many commentators currently arguing that merger policy, across the board, has been too lax in recent years. These raises important questions:

  • Has merger control been too permissive? If so, what are the policy implications? How robust is the evidence for supporting this position?
  • Is the consumer welfare standard usually employed antitrust laws useful or is it time for a change?
  • Do horizontal mergers always give rise to a price increase absent marginal cost efficiencies? Is this an empirical finding or an implication of economic modelling assumptions?
  • How useful are margins and diversion ratios for the assessment of horizontal mergers?
  • Are divestitures reasonable remedies? To which rival should a divested brand be sold?
  • Can acquisitions that are below the threshold of notification be anticompetitive?
  • Under which conditions do acquisitions of competitors lead to discontinuation of an innovation?
  • Are non-horizontal mergers in general pro-competitive or is the difference to horizontal mergers relatively small?