ABOUT US

The Centre for Competition Economics aims to enhance collaboration between academic and professional economists working in the area of competition policy. It serves as a platform for a reciprocal exchange of economic insights on critical issues in the field. Academic economists offer analysis grounded in recent research, while professional economists contribute perspectives based on practical market experience. This dialogue enriches policy discussions and supports informed decision-making in competition policy implementation.

To facilitate this exchange, the Centre hosts regular online seminars open to a broad audience. Each panel includes both academic and professional economists—such as those from consultancies or competition authorities—who share expertise on specific topics. The discussion focuses on extracting policy-relevant conclusions regarding the competitive impact of various business practices. These findings inform both academic work and policy analysis by clarifying the conditions under which certain practices may be considered pro- or anticompetitive.

Each year, the Centre also three awards for the best research paper in industrial organization written by young researchers. The selection emphasizes originality, methodological rigour, and relevance to competition policy. A one-day annual conference is organized around the three award winners who are invited to present their paper.

Although funded by RBB, the Centre operates with full independence. Its Board comprises seven members: Director Claire Chambolle, Fellows Germain Gaudin, Markus Reisinger and Otto Toivanen, and two RBB representatives—Benoît Durand, and Adrian Majumdar.

TOPICS

Mergers
Collusion
Vertical Restraints
Innovation
Industrial Policy
State Aid
PHD Award

Innovation is considered the engine of growth. It is therefore important to understand its determinants. On the one hand, a large strand of the literature in Industrial Organization studying how competition affects innovation has focused on how changes in market structure (proxied by varying concentration, or firm consolidation in a merger) affect firm incentives to invest. The results are mixed, and often depend on the specific modeling assumptions, or market settings. On the other hand, protection of innovation via property rights creates distortion of competition. In either case, a particularly daunting task for economists is the analysis of the dynamic linkages between competition and innovation. Important questions are:

  • How horizontal mergers affect innovation?
  • Should agreements between competitors be exempted from antitrust rules, if these agreements help to adopt a new standard that benefits the environment?