ABOUT US

The Centre for Competition Economics aims to enhance collaboration between academic and professional economists working in the area of competition policy. It serves as a platform for a reciprocal exchange of economic insights on critical issues in the field. Academic economists offer analysis grounded in recent research, while professional economists contribute perspectives based on practical market experience. This dialogue enriches policy discussions and supports informed decision-making in competition policy implementation.

To facilitate this exchange, the Centre hosts regular online seminars open to a broad audience. Each panel includes both academic and professional economists—such as those from consultancies or competition authorities—who share expertise on specific topics. The discussion focuses on extracting policy-relevant conclusions regarding the competitive impact of various business practices. These findings inform both academic work and policy analysis by clarifying the conditions under which certain practices may be considered pro- or anticompetitive.

Each year, the Centre also three awards for the best research paper in industrial organization written by young researchers. The selection emphasizes originality, methodological rigour, and relevance to competition policy. A one-day annual conference is organized around the three award winners who are invited to present their paper.

Although funded by RBB, the Centre operates with full independence. Its Board comprises seven members: Director Claire Chambolle, Fellows Germain Gaudin, Markus Reisinger and Otto Toivanen, and two RBB representatives—Benoît Durand, and Adrian Majumdar.

TOPICS

Mergers
Collusion
Vertical Restraints
Innovation
Industrial Policy
State Aid
PHD Award

Cartels are present in several industries. In particular, competition authorities were able to detect many cartels since around 2000 and levied significant fines on cartel members. Leniency programs helped to make cartel detection easier. However, after detection the determination of the right level of fines is often difficult. Also, the competitive effects may depend heavily on the position of the firms involved in the cartels (i.e., whether the firms are buyers are sellers). Important questions are:

  • When are buyer cartels bad for consumer welfare?
  • Does communication between firms necessarily increase the scope for and sustainability of collusion?
  • Does algorithmic pricing facilitate collusion?
  • Are purchasing alliance between supermarkets good for retail competition or can they be a vehicle for collusion?
  • Which methods are most useful to determine when prices are excessive?
  • How much do industry margins tell us about the intensity of competition?