ABOUT US

The goal of the Centre for Competition Economics is to foster greater interaction between academic and professional economists active in the field of competition policy. The Centre will provide a forum that facilitates a two-way exchange of economics ideas on important topics in competition policy. Academic economists will provide insights from latest research while professional economists will provide insights from their deep analysis of the functioning of particular markets. Such an exchange of ideas will help provide insightful inputs into important policy decisions towards the implementation of competition policy.

To foster such two-way exchange, the Centre will have regular (online) seminars open to a wide audience. The panel will always include both academic and professional economists (e.g., from economic consultancies and/or competition authorities) who will contribute with their expertise on the particular topic of interest. The aim is to distil policy implications that provide insights on the competitive effects of different business practices. These insights can be used in academia and in policy work and help to obtain measurable results under which conditions a particular practice is pro- or anticompetitive.

In addition, each year, the Centre will award a prize of €10k for a very good research paper on competition economics from a Ph.D. student, where the focus will be on originality and rigour of research as well as the contribution to deepen our understanding on matters for competition policy.

The Centre is funded by RBB but is entirely independent. Its Board consists of 7 members, one Director (Markus Reisinger), 3 Fellows (Claire Chambolle, Diane Coyle, and Otto Toivanen), and 3 members from RBB (Simon Bishop, Benoît Durand, and Adrian Majumdar).

TOPICS

Mergers
Collusion
Vertical Restraints
Innovation
Industrial Policy
State Aid
PHD Award

Cartels are present in several industries. In particular, competition authorities were able to detect many cartels since around 2000 and levied significant fines on cartel members. Leniency programs helped to make cartel detection easier. However, after detection the determination of the right level of fines is often difficult. Also, the competitive effects may depend heavily on the position of the firms involved in the cartels (i.e., whether the firms are buyers are sellers). Important questions are:

  • When are buyer cartels bad for consumer welfare?
  • Does communication between firms necessarily increase the scope for and sustainability of collusion?
  • Does algorithmic pricing facilitate collusion?
  • Are purchasing alliance between supermarkets good for retail competition or can they be a vehicle for collusion?
  • Which methods are most useful to determine when prices are excessive?
  • How much do industry margins tell us about the intensity of competition?